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Environmental Law
By CAROLYN S. BRATT" AND CAROLYN M. BiowN*
INTRODUCTION
Under the rubric of environmental law, this Survey addresses
three separate topics: air quality control, water conservation and
development, and zoning.' In the exploration of these three
topics, relevant decisions from the Kentucky courts and the Ken-
tucky Department for Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection, as well as opinions from the Kentucky Attorney Gen-
eral, 2 are analyzed.
I. AnR QUALITY CONTROL
A. Introduction
After a number of attempts to encourage the states to combat
air pollution, 3 Congress in 1970 enacted a series of amendments
Associate Professor of Law, Unjver;ity of Kentucky. J.D. 1974, Syracuse Univer-
" J.D. 1982, University of Kentucky. The authors give special recognition for her in-
valuable editorial assistance to Ann K. Benfield, J.D. 1983, University of Kentucky.
I Hazardous waste is not covered in this Survey because no judicial nor administra-
tive decisions have been handed down since the Kentucky General Assembly enacted a
series of bills in 1980 to comply with the requirements imposed on the states by the Federal
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1976). Ken-
tucky's hazardous waste program was only recently approved by the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) (on April 1, 1981). 46 Fed. Beg. 19,819 (1981). This explains the
lack of case law on the subject.
For a detailed analysis of the Kentucky and federal programs dealing with hazard-
ous waste, see the excellent article by Stephens, Commencing the Decade with Environ-
mental Reform: The 1980 Kentucky General Assembly Implements the Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act of 1976, 69 KY. L.J. 227 (1980-81).2 The Attorney General of Kentucky issues "opinions," not authoritative decisions.
3 In 1955 Congress authorized the Surgeon General to study the problem of air pol-
lution, to support research and demonstration projects, and to provide technical assistance
to state attempts to control air pollution. Air Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 84-159,
69 Stat. 322 (1955). In 1960 Congress directed the Surgeon General to investigate health
hazards from motor vehicle exhaust. Pub. L. No. 86-493, 74 Stat. 162 (1960). In 1963
Congress adopted the Clean Air Act which authorizes federal agencies to increase research
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to the Clean Air Act of 19634 to compel state action. Under these
amendments, although the states retain primary responsibility
for air quality, each state must submit an implementation plan
specifying how national air quality standards will be met and
must attain those standards as expeditiously as possible,' but not
later than three years after approval of the implementation
plan.5 Serving as the touchstone for these implementation plans
are the guidelines formulated by the Federal Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) which promulgate national standards6 for
"ambient air." 7 These regulations establish "primary" standards
to protect the public health8 and "secondary" standards to pro-
tect the public welfare from known or anticipated adverse effects
associated with air pollutants in the ambient air. 9
Kentucky's implementation plan received final approval
from the EPA in 1974.10 Under the plan, the Kentucky General
Assembly delegated responsibility for regulating air quality with-
in the Commonwealth to the Department for Natural Resources
and Environmental Protection (the Department)," although
county air pollution control districts 2 may share jurisdiction with
the Department if certain standards are met. 13 The Department
activity, to make grants to states to develop air pollution control programs, and to inter-
vene directly to stop certain instances of interstate air pollution. Clean Air Act, Pub. L.
No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963). Amendments in 1965 and 1966 to the Clean Air Act ex-
panded the power of the federal government to control motor vehicle exhaust and to make
grants to the states. Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 89-272, §§ 101-03, 79 Stat.
992, 995-96 (1965); Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272, §§ 201-
09, 79 Stat. 992, 992-96 (1965); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-675,
80 Stat. 954 (1966). The federal role in combatting air pollution was further increased by
the Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967).
4 Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970).
5 Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 107(a), 110, 84 Stat. 1678,
1680,42 U.S.C. §§ 7407,7410 (Supp. IV 1980).
6 40 C.F.R. pt. 50 (1981).
7 Ambient air is outdoor air used by the general public. 40 C.F.R. § 50.1(e) (1981).
8 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
9 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
10 39 Fed. Reg. 10,277 (1974). The plan was submitted in February 1972, and re-
ceived initial approval on May 31, 1972.37 Fed. Reg. 10,842, 10,868-69 (1972).
11 Ky. BEV. STAT. ANN. § 224.340 (Bobbs-Merrill 1977) [hereinafter cited as KBS].
12 KIBS §§ 77.005-.990 (1980) state the procedure for establishing county air pollu-
tion control districts and prescribe the role of such districts.
13 KRS § 224.450(2) (1977).
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is empowered to establish emission standards for air contam-
inants;1 to require air pollution control districts to adopt regula-
tions and standards no less stringent than the Department's reg-
ulations;15 to revoke an air pollution control district's concurrent
jurisdiction for failure to administer its program in compliance
with the statutes and the Department's regulations; 16 and to re-
quire any air contaminant producer to obtain a permit for oper-
ation or construction.17
B. "Prevention of Significant Deterioration" Review
The Clean Air Act establishes a method for protecting exist-
ing air quality 8 as well as a method for improving air quality. 19
In order to accomplish the former objective, EPA promulgated
uniform national air quality standards for certain pollutants. 20 A
region which meets these standards for a particular pollutant is
then subject to a "Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD)
14 KRS § 224.330 (1977).
15 KRS § 224.450(2) (1977).
16 Id.
17 401 Ky. ADMiN. lEGs. 50:035 (1980), adopted pursuant to KRS § 224.033 (1977)
which requires the Department to prescribe regulations for the prevention, abatement,
and control of air pollution.
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court held that federal facilities were not sub-
ject to state permit requirements under § 118 of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, al-
though the Court agreed § 118 did embody Congressional intent to require federal facil-
ities to comply with state emission standards and compliance schedules. 42 U.S.C. § 7418
(1976, amended 1980). Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 190-99 (1976). The Hancock case
arose from efforts of the Kentucky Department of Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection (DNREP) to apply the Department's permit requirements to federal air pollu-
tion sources in the state. When the federal facilities refused to obtain permits, Kentucky
brought the action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.
In 1977, following the Supreme Court's ruling in Hancock, Congress amended §
118 to make clear its intent that not only the substantive requirements of state air pollution
plans adopted under the Clean Air Act, but also state procedural requirements are fully
applicable to federal facilities. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, S
116(a), 91 Stat. 711. The House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee's report
specifically states that the committee's intent in amending § 118 was to overrule through
legislation the Supreme Court's decision in Hancock. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 199, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1277-78. See 42 U.S.C. §
7418(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
18 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-91 (Supp. IV 1980).
19 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-08 (Supp. IV 1980).
20 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.13-.14 (1981).
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increment" for the pollutant. The PSD increment sets a legal
parameter on the degree to which the air in the region may be-
come more polluted before the permissible limit for the pollutant
(PSD ceiling) is exceeded. 21 The difference between a current
level of pollution in an area for a particular type of pollutant and
the PSD ceiling for that pollutant is called the "available PSD in-
crement," and as local air pollution emissions increase, the
amount of "available PSD increment" decreases until further in-
creases in air pollution emissions for that particular pollutant are
impermissible.
The development of any major new source of air pollution
obviously has the potential of consuming part or all of the "avail-
able PSD increment" for a particular pollutant in any given area.
Under the mechanism of a PSD review, the Department for Nat-
ural Resources and Environmental Protection allocates the
"available PSD increment" for. a particular pollutant in a region
among air contaminant producers on a first-come basis.2 -
In Western Kraft Paper Group v. DNREP,2 the Kentucky
Court of Appeals held that DNREP's allocation of "available
PSD increment" to a utility company was proper even though the
utility had not obtained a certificate of public convenience and
necessity from the state Energy Regulatory Commission, a certif-
icate which is a prerequisite to construction by a utility.24 West-
ern Kraft objected to the Department's PSD allocation because it
planned to expand its operations in the same county, and could
not do so if the utility company possessed the "available PSD in-
crement."2 5 Western Kraft contended that the utility company
was required by KRS section 278.020(3)26 to obtain a certificate
of convenience and necessity prior to applying to the Department
for a PSD review, and that the utility company's failure to obtain
the certificate invalidated the Department's reservation of the
"available PSD increment" to the utility. 2
21 42 U.S.C. § 7473 (Supp. IV 1980).
22Western Kraft Paper Group v. DNREP, 632 S.W.2d 454, 455 (Ky. Ct. App.
1981).
23 632 S.W.2d 454 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
24 See KRS § 278.020(3) (1981).
25 632 S.W.2d at 455.
26 See KRS § 278.020(3) (1981).
27 632 S.W.2d at 454.
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The Kentucky Court of Appeals found that subsection (1),
not subsection (3), of KRS section 278.020 applied to the case.2
Relying on prior decisions construing the two sections,29 the court
noted that subsection (1) applies only to cases of new utility con-
struction and does not prohibit a utility from obtaining needed
authority from other government agencies before applying for a
certificate of public convenience and necessity. ° In contrast,
subsection (3) does prohibit a utility from going to other govern-
ments or agencies before obtaining a certificate, but that subsec-
tion applies only when the utility plans to expand its services
without new construction.3' Since the utility in Western Kraft
Paper Group was planning only to construct new facilities, not to
expand its service, the court found that subsection (1) applied
and the reservation of the "available PSD increment" was proper
even though the utility did not obtain a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity prior to the reservation.
32
C. Department Reversal of a Prior Decision
Western Kraft Paper Group also considered the question of
whether the Department has the authority to reverse its own
prior order. 3 After the utility company had applied for a PSD re-
view, the Department reserved the "available PSD increment" to
the utility.3 But approximately one year later, the Department
suspended the PSD reservation until the utility company applied
2 Id. at 456. The Energy Regulatory Commission apparently advised the Depart-
ment to the same effect when asked for its assistance in determining the propriety of grant-
ing the reservation to Kentucky Utilities when no certificate had yet been obtained. Id. at
455.
29 The court cited two decisions in support of this distinction, Kentucky Util. Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 252 S.W.2d 885 (Ky. 1952), and Public Serv. Comm'n v. Blue
Grass Natural Gas Co., 197 S.W.2d 765 (Ky. 1946).
30 See KRS § 278.020(1) (1981). Much more information is required to be submitted
with an application for a certificate for construction than is required when applying for a
certificate for service. Compare 807 Ky. ADMIN. BEc. 5:001E § 8(1) (1981) regarding ser-
vice certificates with 807 Ky. ADMIN. REc. 5:001E § 8(2) concerning construction applica-
tions.
31 KRS § 278.020(3) (1981).
32 632 S.W.2d at 456.
3 Id. at 455.
34 Id. at 454.
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to the Energy Regulatory Commission for a certificate of conve-
nience and necessity. Less than thirty days later, the Department
withdrew its suspension after determining that a utility company
which plans to construct a new plant does not have to obtain the
certificate prior to applying for state environmental authoriza-
tion for new construction.- Western Kraft claimed that the De-
partment lacked authority to reverse its suspension decision. -8
The Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the Department
has the authority to correct or change its decision as long as it re-
tains subject matter jurisdiction.3 7 It found that the Department
continued to have such jurisdiction because the language of the
suspension order was tentative and because KRS section
224.081(2) "specifically authorizes" the Department to reverse its
own decisions. 8 The court reasoned that since KRS section
224.081(2)39 enables a person aggrieved by a determination of the
Department to demand a hearing within thirty days, that the
statute impliedly gives the Department jurisdiction over the mat-
ter for thirty days following issuance of the suspension order. 40 In
3 Id. at 454-55.
36 Id. at 454.
37 Id. at 455. Western Kraft asserted that Phelps v. Sallee, 529 S.W.2d 361 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1975), should be followed to support a finding that the Department was without au-
thority to reverse itself and withdraw the suspension. In Phelps, the court had held that
the Banking and Services Commissioner lacked statutory authority to modify, change or
set aside an order approving articles of incorporation once it had been issued. Id. In West-
ern Kraft Paper Group the court distinguished Phelps on the ground that the statutes gov-
erning banking are different than those which apply to the Department. 632 S.W.2d at
455.
The court of appeals in Western Kraft Paper Group instead relied on Union Light,
Heat & Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 271 S.W.2d 361 (Ky. 1954) which held the
Public Service Commission could set aside a prior order as long as the agency, like a court,
retained subject matter control over the question submitted to it. Id. at 365-66.
38 632 S.W.2d at 455. The court's reasoning that reversal is "specifically authorized"
is open to attack on the ground that KRS § 224.081(2) (Cum. Supp. 1980) is intended only
to provide a method for challenge of Department determinations. Procedures for notice
and hearings before the Department which could, through the adversary process, result in
a hearing officer overturning an order are not the same as a provision authorizing the De-
partment to reverse itself basically on its own motion. The court's analysis of KRS §
224.081(2) (Cum. Supp. 1980) in Western Kraft Paper Group seems even more suspect in
light of the language in Phelps that "such power does not exist where it is not specifically
conferred upon the agency by the express terms of the statute creating the agency." 529
S.W.2d at 365.
39 KRS § 224.081(2) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
40 632 S.W.2d at 455.
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this case as the Department acted within thirty days, its reversal
was a timely one.
41
II. WATER CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT
42
A. Introduction
Recognizing that growth in population, expansion of indus-
try, and advances in technology create ever increasing demands
for water for industrial, municipal, and recreational uses, while
droughts, flooding, and pollution limit use of water resources
and damage other resources, 43 the Kentucky General Assembly
has enacted statutes to promote and regulate the conservation,
development, and beneficial use of Kentucky's water resources. 44
These statutes make DNREP responsible for administering
various aspects of the state's water management programs as
well as developing appropriate rules and regulations. 45 For
example, the Department has the power to issue permits for the
construction of any obstruction across or along a stream, 46 and it
also controls the issuance of permits for water withdrawal. 4 The
Department administers the Wild Rivers Act as well. 48
41 Id.
4 2 The authors have attempted to include in this section important administrative
decisions handed down by DNREP. The reader should bear in mind, however, that a
comprehensive treatment of administrative decisions is not possible largely because re-
search in this area is very difficult. Department decisions are neither published nor com-
piled into a topical index. The administrative cases which are included were discovered
through conversations with Department attorneys and former hearing officers. The
authors appreciate the assistance of Hugh Archer, Carl Breeding, Alan Harrington, John
R. Leathers, Pedro Miranda, Ronald Van Stockum, Jr., and Bob Yarbrough in the re-
search process.
Although these administrative decisions are not published, they are a matter of
public record and copies may be obtained through the Office of General Counsel,
DNREP, Fifth Floor, Capital Plaza Tower, Frankfort, Kentucky 40601.
43 KRS § 151.110 (1980).
44 KRS §§ 146.200-.350 (1980 & Cum. Supp. 1980) (Wild Rivers Act); KRS §§
151.010-.990 (1980 & Cum. Supp. 1980); KS §§ 262.010-.990 (1981); KRS § 350.029
(1977); KRS § 433.757 (1975).
45 KS § 151.125 (1980).
48 KS § 151.125(6) (1980).
47 KS § 151.125(4) (1980).
48 KS § 146.270 (1980).
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B. Construction Permits
Any person, city, county, or political subdivision of the Com-
monwealth must obtain a permit from DNREP before beginning
construction of an embankment, levee, dike, bridge, fill, or other
obstruction across or along any stream, or in the floodway of any
stream. 49 This permitting power is similar to the Department's
power to grant or deny surface mining permits, and has been the
subject of recent administrative proceedings.0
In Susan K. Uebel,51 the hearing officer sustained the Depart-
ment's reliance on a 1974 "final" floodway map rather than an
1979 "preliminary" floodway map in approving a permit appli-
cation for construction of a barge loading facility on land adja-
cent to the Ohio River. A citizen lodged a challenge to the issu-
ance of a permit,52 alleging that the Department had failed to
consider properly that the facility might increase the danger of
flooding.53 The petitioners contended that the Department
should have used the 1979 "preliminary" map because it in-
cluded the area subject to the proposed permit while the 1974
map did not.54
The hearing officer noted testimony that the 1979 map was
prepared for the purpose of eliciting public comment and correc-
tions,-, and that the Department itself recommended changes in
49 KRS § 151.250(1) (1980). This section does authorize DNREP to issue regulations
exempting from the permit requirement dams, embankments or other obstructions which
are not of such size and type as to require approval by the Department. The Department
has never issued such regulations.
50 In Chester Coleman, DNREP Rep. No. 1823-V-14 (May 23, 1980), the Depart-
ment's permit power was challenged but the action was dismissed by the hearing officer
because petitioners made only general allegations and failed to support their claims with
sufficient evidence.
5' DNREP Rep. No. 2222-04 (Sept. 25,1981).
52 A hearing on the challenge was held pursuant to KRS § 151.180 (1980).
53 There was evidence that natural drainage in the area had become obstructed due
to erosion from poor farming methods. Susan K. Uebel, DNREP Rep. No. 2222-04, at 4.
Also the landowners testified that the permitted area had been flooded three times in the
past decade. Id. report at 2-3.
54 Id. at 4-5. The permit could be properly issued only if the site was located outside
the floodway area and drainage was found adequate. Id. at 5.
a Id. at 6-7.
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the map which would place the area in question outside the
floodway.56 The officer then concluded that the permit was is-
sued on the basis of the best data available and thus was valid.57
In Willie Blankenship,58 a private citizen failed to obtain a
construction permit prior to building an embankment along a
creek. 59 The Secretary issued an order ® requiring removal of junk
cars used in the embankment fill and grading of the remaining
fill to a two-to-one slope. 61 The petitioner appealed the order at
an administrative hearing. 62
The evidence produced at the hearing established that the
petitioner, in the aftermath of a serious flood, innocently relied
on the oral permission of county officials to construct the em-
bankment instead of applying to the Department for a construc-
tion permit.3 The petitioner admitted using junk cars as the
foundation of the fill. 4 Although the Department no longer con-
siders this method of fill construction an accepted engineering
practice, the evidence showed that another state agency had used
such a method of construction in the past. 5 Indeed, the county
used a new approved method on the side of the creek opposite the
56 Id. at6.
57 Although the decision upheld the Department's action, it suggested that the peti-
tioners missed a potentially successful bisis of attack. At the pretrial conference, the peti-
tioners had questioned whether the Department had developed regulations to insure ap-
propriate consideration of specific elements in deciding permit requests. The issue was not
pursued at the hearing, but the hearing officer did note that "the issuance of permits in the
factual circumstances of this case seems at best to be an ad hoe effort." Id. at 8.
0 DNREP Rep. No. 2140-04 (Oct. 20, 1980).
59 The petitioner's failure to obtain a construction permit from the Department vi-
olated KRS § 151.150(2) (1980). See also KRS § 151.140(1980) (requiring withdrawal per-
mits).-
60 DNREP Rep. No. 2140-04, at 3. The Secretary of the Department issued the order
pursuant to KRS §§ 151.125(5), .297(2) (1980).
61 DNREP Rep. No. 2140-04, at 3.
62 The hearing was held pursuant to KS § 151.180 (1980) (repealed 1980).
63 DNREP Rep. No. 2140-04, at 7. The official testified they would not have granted
their approval if they had known where the petitioner intended to place the fill. The hear-
ing officer, in considering the testimony, noted the confusion which existed at the time of
the 1979 flood and concluded that Blankenship's failure to adequately explain the location
of the fill *,as "no less understandable than the County officials' failure to explore more
fully the fill's location prior to granting approval." Id. at 9.
64 Id. at2.
65 Id. at 7.
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petitioner's fill, but the evidence established that the county's fill
had washed out during a subsequent heavy rainfall while the pe-
titioner's "improperly" constructed fill had not.0 Furthermore,
the Department failed to establish a sufficient basis for its deter-
mination that a two-to-one slope was necessary to maintain the
stability of the fill and to prevent erosion.7
Considering all the evidence, including photographs of the
petitioner's fill, the hearing officer recommended, and the Secre-
tary agreed, that the only equitable solution was to allow the em-
bankment to remain.6 The Secretary issued a new order requir-
ing the petitioner merely to finish seeding the slope and to plant
trees. 69
C. Compensation of Landowners Under the Kentucky Wild
Rivers Act
In 1972 the Kentucky General Assembly enacted the Ken-
tucky Wild Rivers Act, 70 which is intended to preserve certain
streams in their free-flowing condition because their natural,
scenic, scientific, and aesthetic values outweigh their present and
future value for water development. 71 To attain that goal, the
Wild Rivers Act attempts to maintain the primitive character of
streams designated as "wild rivers" 72 by regulating the use of sur-
rounding public and private property. 73
6
6Id. at 5-6.
17 Id. at 8. The Department's experts testified that the fill would be unstable because
soil would not adhere to the car surfaces, resulting in erosion and possible slides once the
soil became wet and lubricated. Id. at 4. The Department failed to identify clearly the soil
composition, however-one of three necessary factors in determining the proper slope. Id.
at 8.
6 Id. at 10.
69 The amended order was made on October 20, 1980.
70 Act of Mar. 23, 1972, ch. 117, §§ 1-17, 1972 Ky. Acts 525, 525-33 (codified as
KRS §§ 146.200-.350 (1980), amended Act of Mar. 29, 1976, ch. 197, §§ 1-11, 1976 Ky.
Acts 442, 442-45, recodified KBS §§ 146.200-.360 (1980 & Cure. Supp. 1980)).
71 KRS § 146.220 (1980).
7 2 Id. KRS § 146.241 (1980) designates eight rivers, or parts thereof, as wild rivers.
KRS § 146.260(1) (1980) directs the Secretary of DNREP to propose other rivers'for future
addition to the wild rivers system.
73 The land use restrictions in designated stream areas imposed by the 1972 Act were
contained in Act of Mar. 23, 1972, ch. 117, § 10, 1972 Ky. Acts 525, 530-31, (amended
[Vol. 70
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In Commonwealth v. Stephens,74 the landowners defended
an action brought by DNREP to enforce the restrictions on land
use75 by challenging the constitutionality of the restrictions as a
taking of property without just compensation. 76 The Kentucky
Supreme Court held that the Department's attempt to enjoin the
defendants' activities failed because the Secretary of the Depart-
ment had not designated the boundaries of the wild rivers sys-
tem;77 and, therefore, the Court could not determine whether the
Act of Mar. 29, 1976, ch. 197, § 9, 1976 Ky. Acts 442, 444, codified KRS § 146.290
(1980)). The General Assembly amended this section in 1976 to ease restrictions on land
use. See the text accompanying notes 82-86 infra for discussion of the amendment.
74 539 S.W.2d 303 (Ky. 1976). For an in-depth analysis of the decision, see Com-
ment, Commonwealth v. Stephens: The Taking Doctrine at Work in Environmental
Land Use Planning, 65 Ky. L.J. 729 (1976-77).
75 539 S.W.2d at 304. DNREP sued to enjoin the landowners from cutting timber or
otherwise disturbing an area surrounding the Cumberland River, a designated wild river.
Cutting of timber was prohibited by KRS § 146.290 (Act of Mar. 23, 1972, ch. 117, § 10,
1972 Ky. Acts 525, 530-31, amended Act of Mar. 29, 1976, ch. 197, § 9, 1976 Ky. Acts
442,444-45)).
76 539 S.W.2d at 306-08. The landowners based their defense on a claim of inverse
condemnation, i.e., a claim for recovery of the value of the property they alleged the gov-
ernment had taken indirectly without formally exercising its power of eminent domain.
The defendants argued that although the Wild Rivers Act was constitutional, it was not a
valid exercise of the state's police power, and that it authorized through its provisions re-
stricting use of property in designated river areas a taking of private property for which
compensation must be paid. Id. at 306.
Exercises of eminent domain require compensation for the taking of private prop-
erty for public use, Comment, supra note 74, at 731. In contrast, a reasonable exercise of
the police power does not impose a duty to compensate property owners on the statt.even
though some suffer economic losses as a result. City of Shively v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 349
S.W.2d 682, 685 (Ky. 1961), appeal dismissed, 369 U.S. 120 (1962). See Comment, supra
note 74, at 732. A purportedly valid exercise of the police power, however, may impose re-
strictions on land use so great that the government's actions constitute an indirect taking of
property, and compensation of the property owner is required. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922); Comment, supra note 74, at 732. To determine whe-
ther restrictions on use constitute a taking, the diminution in value of the subject property
must be balanced against the benefits accruing to the general public from the imposed re-
strictions. 260 U.S. at 413-14.
77 539 S.W.2d at 308. The case was decided under the Act of Mar. 23, 1972, ch. 117,
§ 6, 1972 Ky. Acts 525, 528-29 (codified prior to its amendment in 1976 as KRS § 146.250)
which directs the Secretary of the Department to set the boundaries of the stream area
associated with the wild river by June 16, 1974. The boundaries must include at least the
visual horizon from the stream but should not exceed 2,500 feet from the center of the
stream. Although it found the provision requiring designation of boundaries to be manda-
tory, the Court determined the date set by the legislature for action was directory only.
539 S.W.2d at 308. The Act as amended in 1976 contains the same deadline. Act of Mar.
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alleged land use violations had occurred within an area subject to
the Act. 78 In addition, the Court held that enforcement of the
land use restrictions contained in the Wild Rivers Act constituted
a taking which would require compensation of the affected prop-
erty owners79 under both the Act8° and section thirteen of the
Kentucky Constitution.81
The impact of Stephens was muted by the action of the Ken-
tucky General Assembly the same year. Learning of the lower
court's adverse decision requiring the Department to compensate
landowners whose property lay within the wild rivers system, the
29, 1976, ch. 197, § 5, 1976 Ky. Acts 442, 444 (codified as amended at KRS § 146.250
(1980)).
78 539 S.W.2d at 308. Justice Palmore in his concurrence identified this as the true
basis of the decision and pointed out that the Court did not need to analyze the constitu-
tionality of the Act. Id. at 309 (Palmore, J., concurring).
79Id.
80 See 539 S.W.2d at 306. The Court relied in part on KRS § 146.280(1) (1980)
which provides in pertinent part: "Nothing in [the Wild Rivers Act] shall be construed to
deprive a landowner of the fee simple title to or lesser interest in his property without just
compensation."
81 539 S.W.2d at 307. The Kentucky Constitution provides, "nor shall any man's
property be taken or applied to public use without the consent of his representatives, and
without just compensation being previously made to him." Ky. CONsT. § 13. As the plain
language of the provision indicates and as it has been interpreted by the Kentucky courts,
the state must compensate the property owner before the property is taken. See, e.g.,
Goodwin v. Goodwin's Ex'r, 290 S.W.2d 458 (Ky. 1956).
Although the majority in Stephens does not clearly state its rationale for holding
that enforcement of the Act's land use restrictions would constitute a taking, two findings
are implied which are necessary to the holding. First, the Court recognized that owner-
ship of property encompasses the privilege to use and enjoy it as the landowner sees fit,
and that infringement of this privilege is an infringement of his property interest. 539
S.W.2d at 305-06. Thus, if the restrictions are viewed as "depriv[ing] a landowner
of... [a] lesser interest in his property" for purposes of KRS § 146.280(1) (1980), the
state is obligated to compensate landowners whose property use is restricted.
Secondly, the majority opinion implies that the Court considered the Act's restric-
tions to be such an unreasonable exercise of the state's police power as to constitute an indi-
rect taking, and obligate the state to compensate the affected landowners. The Court,
without expressly finding that the restrictions of the 1972 Act were unreasonable, cited
Pennsylvania Coal, the United States Siupreme Court case which held that compensation
is due when the state's police power is unreasonably exercised. 539 S.W.2d at 306 (citing
Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)). Justice Palmores concurring opinion flat-
ly states that the restrictions are excessive. Id. at 309 (Palmore, J., concurring). See note 76
supra for a discussion of the Pennsylvania Coal case.
The Stephens Court did refuse to hold that mere enactment of the Wild Rivers Act
constituted a taking and instead construed it as enabling legislation under which a taking
occurs when the Act is unreasonably applied. Id. at 306-07.
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General Assembly amended the Wild Rivers Act in 1976, while
Stephens was on appeal. 82 The Act's provision for "just compen-
sation"83 to owners of certain property interests within the wild
rivers system was modified to apply only to acquisition of "ease-
ments or lesser interests in or fee title to lands within the author-
ized boundaries of the wild rivers" in an effort to make compen-
sation unavailable when the Act's effect on a landowner is only to
restrict use, not to require transfer of a property interest.s In ad-
dition, land use restrictions were eased. Construction of new
roads and buildings is now allowed if necessary to carry out a
permitted use. Mining, other than strip mining, is no longer ab-
solutely prohibited, while existing uses and the attendant utiliza-
tion of mechanical transportation are exempted from the land
use limitations. The landowner may also apply for a change of
use to allow selective cutting of timber, resource removal or agri-
cultural use. 86
Despite the 1976 amendments, the taking issue remains sig-
nificant under the Kentucky Wild Rivers Act. Stephens clearly
has continued vitality when applied to a fact pattern in which a
taking of the property is found to have occurred prior to 1976.87
82Act of Mar. 29, 1976, ch. 197, §§ 1-11, 1976 Ky. Acts 442, 442-45 (codified as
amended as KRS §§ 146.200-.360 (1980 & Cur. Supp. 1980)). See Comment, supra note
74, at 738-39.
83 Act of Mar. 23, 1972, ch. 117, § 10, 1972 Ky. Acts 525, 530-31.
8 KRS § 146.220 (1980).
85 Comment, supra note 74, at 739. However, note that the change of langiuage still
does not avoid compensation if the court finds the amended restrictions are still so exces-
sive as to be an unreasonable exercise of the state's police power, if enforced, and so sub-
stantial an infringement of the landowner's privilege to use and enjoy his property as to in-
fringe on a property interest. See note 81 supra for a discussion of the role of these two
findings in the Stephens case. Furthermore, § 13 of the Kentucky Constitution requiring
payment of just compensation for a taking of private property for public use would still be
controlling despite the legislature's attempt to narrow the compensation clause in'the Wild
Rivers Act. See note 81 supra for the pertinent text of § 13.
88 Compare Act of Mar. 23, 1972, ch. 117, § 10, 1972 Ky. Acts 525, 530-31 with
KRS § 146.290 (1980) (as amended Act of Mar. 29, 1976, ch. 197, § 9, 1976 Ky. Acts 442,
444).
7 The appeals process may soon bring such a case to the Court. The McCreary Cir-
cuit Court has held in Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Commonwealth, No. 2994 (Mc-
Creary Cir. Ct. Jan. 30, 1981), that the Department was liable for damages for a taking of
property whose use, particularly for strip mining, was restricted by the Act.
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In theory, the amendments should compel a different interpreta-
tion of the issue when the 1976 Act applies.81 But the intended ex-
pansion of permissible'land uses under the amendments becomes
illusory on closer examination. For example, although the pres-
ent Act supposedly provides for select cutting of timber and other
resource removal pursuant to regulations promulgated by the
Secretary of DNREP if accompanied by issuance of a permit, no
such regulations have been forthcoming from the Department
and, thus, the pre-1976 restrictions still apply to these uses. 9
Strip mining and instream dredging are still absolutely prohib-
ited, and modes of travel continue to be severely restricted within
protected areas.9° Existing and agricultural uses are permitted
but these hardly satisfy the desire of some landowners to use their
property for more profitable but restricted uses. Thus, the 1976
amendments have little effect on the application of the Act, so
that the Stephens interpretation of the Act requiring compensa-
tion to affected landowners may survive the 1976 amendments. 91
The circuit court in Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. concluded that the enforcement
of provisions of the Kentucky Wild Rivers Act and other actions by the Department over a
three year period resulted in a taking of the plaintiff's property in 1975. Id. Judge Johnson
found the property in question, which included not only a fee simple ownership but min-
eral rights as well, had diminished in value due to the restrictions on mining and other uses
imposed by the Act and that the land could not be used profitably. Id., slip op. at 6, 11.
The court rejected the Department's argument that the 1976 amendments to the Act
should govern whether a taking had occurred and suggested further that the permitting
provision added in 1976 might be an unlawful delegation of power to the Department. Id.
at 13-14. The Stephens problem of failure to designate the wild river area is not present in
Stearns Coal because evidence was introduced that the Department had designated the
boundaries of the protected zone surrounding the wild river at issue in the case.
8 Comment, supra note 74 at 738-40. While the author of this Comment adopted
this optimistic viewpoint, the writer could not have known that the Department would
fail to enact regulations enabling the 1976 amendments to have the desired effect.
89 KRS § 146.290 (1980). In fact, restrictions on cutting timber was one of the re-
strictions specifically at issue in Stephens. 539 S.W.2d at 304.
90 KRS § 146.290 (1980).
91 If the Stephens decision has continued vitality after the 1976 amendments to the
Act, the Court has dealt a perhaps deadly blow to the wild river system in Kentucky by in-
terpreting the Act as requiring compensation to be paid to all landowners whose property
lays within the stream area. The estimated cost of acquisition by the state of such property
interests was approximately 74 million dollars in 1976. Comment, supra note 74, at 745.
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D. Liability Under the Fish and Wildlife Resources Act 92
No private or public person, firm or corporation is permitted
to place any substance in public waters which might injure aqua-
tic life. 93 In City of Murray v. Commonwealth,94 a municipality
discharged raw sewage into a stream because of a malfunction in
a sewage treatment plant built to state specifications. 9 The city
argued that liability could not be imposed for the resulting death
of certain species of fish because the city had not been negli-
gent. 96
The Kentucky Court of Appeals found that, in prohibiting
placement of injurious substances in public waters, the General
Assembly intended to afford the greatest protection possible to
aquatic life. 97 According to the court, the legislature would have
stated its intent to impose liability only in cases of negligence, if
that had been its intent.98 Therefore, the court concluded that
the statute imposed strict liability99 on the city for the damage
caused by the release of raw sewage into the river.
92 KRS §§ 150.010-.993 (1980 & Cum. Supp. 1980).
93 KRS § 150.460 (1980).
94 584 S.W.2d 403 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
95 Id. at 404. Several recent federal cases have interpreted similar pollution dis-
charge regulations under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1376 (Supp. IV 1980), including United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d
1317 (6th Cir. 1974) (upholding regulation of discharge of pollutants into a nonnavigable
tributory of a navigable stream and imposing a fine on Ashland Oil for failing to give im-
mediate notice of such discharge); United States v. Beatty, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1040 (W.D.
Ky. 1975) (holding reasonable a regulation which deemed that discharge of oil causing a
sheen or film or discoloration of the water is harmful and affirming imposition of appro-
priate civil penalties); United States v. Kentland-Elkhorn Coal Corp., 353 F. Supp. 451
(E.D. Ky. 1973) (regarding the propriety of issuing a civil injunction to prevent criminal
violation of the Act through discharge of blackwater due to coal operations, and holding
that discharge of blackwater does constitute an "obstruction" of navigable waters and
"refuse" for purposes of the Act).
96 584 S.W.2d at 404.
97 Id. at 405.
9 Id. The Court noted that KRS § 150.015 (1980) provides that the language of the
statute be liberally construed to further the legislative purpose of preserving and conserv-
ing wildlife. 584 S.W.2d at 405.
99 Id. The Court noted that prior Kentucky decisions had accepted the strict liability
doctrine in products liability cases, citing Ulrich v. Kasco Abrasives Co., 532 S.W.2d 197
(Ky. 1976); Kroger Co. v. Bowman, 411 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. 1967).
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III. ZONING
A. Introduction
Land use control, like air and water regulation, is aimed at
resource conservation and development and has a tremendous
impact on tle environment of particular communities. An exam-
ination of zoning cases is therefore essential to our discussion of
environmental law. 100
Planning and zoning are primarily local issues, but local ordi-
nances must comply with the prerequisites imposed by the Com-
monwealth's Zoning Enabling Act.101 Initially, a planning unit,
consisting of a city or county acting independently, cities and
their counties acting jointly, or groups of counties and their cities
acting regionally, must be formed'02 and a planning commission
appointed.l15 Thereafter, the planning commission must prepare
a comprehensive plan to assure that public and private develop-
ment occurs in an orderly fashion. °4 The Zoning Enabling Act
delineates the minimum elements of a comprehensive plan, 15 as
well as the minimum research required to support the elements
of the plan.'15 If these prerequisites are met, zoning ordinances in
conformance with the comprehensive plan may be adopted by
the cities and counties within the planning unit. 10
B. Subdivision Regulations
The planning commission may adopt regulations for the sub-
division of land after it has completed the statement of objec-
tives, land use, transportation, and community facilities ele-
ments of the comprehensive plan. Once the commission has
100 See Griffin & Becker, Zoning-Kentucky Law Survey, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-79)
for a recent survey of Kentucky zoning law.
1o1 KRS §§ 100.111-.991 (1982).
102 KRS §§ 100.113 (1982).
103 The method of appointing planning commission members in most cases is deline-
ated in KRS § 100.133 (1982). The procedure for appointing a commission in a county
with a population greater than 300,000 is contained in KES § 100.137 (1982).
104 KRS § 100.183 (1982).
105 KRS § 100.187 (1982).
1o6 KRS § 100.191 (1982).
107 KRS § 100.207 (1982).
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adopted subdivision regulations, any subdivision of land must be
approved by the commission. 108
In Lampton v. Pinaire,10 9 developers applied to the local
planning and zoning commission for approval of their subdivi-
sion plat. The commission conditioned its approval on the devel-
opers' dedication to the county of additional land for a right-of-
way along an existing street n1 and on the county fiscal court's
agreement to improve the existing street.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the zoning com-
mission had the authority under the Commonwealth's Zoning
Enabling Act to require the developers to dedicate additional
right-of-way as a condition precedent to approval of the de-
velopers' subdivision plan."2 The court emphasized that it was il-
logical to allow private development of property to increase traf-
fic on adjacent, preexisting roads and then to require the local
community to bear the expense of condemning property to im-
prove roads to meet the increased traffic burden." mThe court re-
manded the case to the trial court, however, to determine the
108 KRS § 100.273 (1982). The regulations adopted must conform to the comprehen-
sive plan and include requirements for the design of streets, utilities, recreation areas and
other facilities, specifications for the physical improvement of streets, utilities and other
facilities, and requirements for reserving land for public use pending government pur-
chase. KRS § 100.281 (1982).
KRS § 100.277 (1982) prohibits subdividing any property, recording any subdivi-
sion plat or selling any lots until the developer has obtained commission approval.
109 610 S.W.2d 915 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
110 Id. at 917. The county's subdivision regulations set forth explicit guidelines for
dedication. Id. at 918.
Il Id. at 917.
112 The trial court had held that the provisions of the county subdivision regulations
requiring dedication of additional right-of-way for existing streets were unconstitutional
as a taking of property without just compensation. The court of appeals reversed, holding
that a local government may adopt subdivision regulations which require dedication of
land for public purposes if the state's statutes authorizes such dedication, and if the regula-
tion is applied reasonably and with due process. Id. at 918-19.
The court found state statutory authority for the Lampton regulatfonsin KRS §
100.281(4), (5) (1982). Although the court indicated that subsection five provided author-
ization for the subdivision regulations containing dedication requirements, that section
deals only with provisions to reserve land, not dedicate it. For a discussion of the use of res-
ervation provisions in land use planning, see the notes to MODEL LAND Dzv. CODE §§ 3-
201, -202 (Proposed Official Draft 1975).
113 610 S.W.2d at 919. The concept underlying dedication requirements and other
exactions on subdivision developers is cost internalization. 3 E. YOKELY, ZONING LAW AND
PRACTICE § 17-8 (4th ed. 1979).
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reasonableness of the amount of land the developer was required
to dedicate for the right-of-way.
114
The court held invalid the second condition placed on ap-
proval of the developers' plat- an agreement by the county's fis-
cal court to improve existing streets. 115 It found that the zoning
commission does not have the authority to require a fiscal court,
an independent legislative body, to agree to make improve-
ments. 116 Rather, by dedicating the additional right-of-way, the
developer had complied with the promulgated zoning regula-
tions and the zoning commission must approve the developers'
subdivision plat. 117
C. Denial of Zoning Change Requests
An accepted objective of planning is the elimination of non-
conforming uses.'18 The court of appeals' decision in Landgrave
v. Watson"9 is consistent with this objective. In Landgrave, the
plaintiffs had purchased a service station which was a noncon-
forming use'20 in a residential district.12 1 Without applying for the
114 610 S.W.2d at 919.
115 Id. at 920.
"' Id. The sought-after approval concerned a county road. Improvement of county
roads is solely within the authority of the fiscal court.
117 Id. Approval of subdivision plats upon compliance with regulations is considered
a ministerial act. Snyder v. Owensboro, 529 S.W.2d 663, 664 (Ky. Ct. App. 1975).
118 See4 E. YoKELY, supra note 113, at § 22-7.
119 593 S.W.2d 875 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
120 Kentucky's Zoning Enabling Act defines a "nonconforming use or structure" as
"an activity or a building, sign, structure or portion thereof which lawfully existed before
the adoption or amendment of the zoning regulation, but which does not conform to all of
the regulations contained in the zoning regulation which pertain to the zone in which it is
located." KRS § 100.111(12) (1982). In order to be a valid nonconforming use, the use
must have been lawfully in existence at the time the zoning ordinance was enacted or
amended and have been continued since that time. 4 E. YOKELY, supra note 113, at § 22-
2. Occasional activity on the property will not suffice to establish a nonconforming use.
Durning v. Summerfield, 235 S.W.2d 761, 763 (Ky. 1951) (holding that occasional use of
property in a residential zone for a carnival did not establish a nonconforming use).
Ordinances authorizing nonconforming uses were enacted in response to fears of
unconstitutionality if immediate discontinuance of the use was required, especially since a
nonconforming use, once created, runs with the land and can be likened to a property
right. 4 E. YOKELY, supra note 113, at § 22-6.
121 The property in question was zoned commercial in 1943. 593 S.W.2d at 876.
While the commercial classification was in effect, the service station was constructed. In
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appropriate zoning change, they began to convert the property
into a liquor store.'2 After being served with a cease and desist
order, the plaintiffs did apply for a zoning change.123The city-
county planning commission and the fiscal court denied their re-
quest. 2 4 The circuit court then overruled the denial of the zoning
change request and ordered the county to amend its zoning map
to reflect the commercial classification of the property.
12s
The Kentucky Court of Appeals reviewed the evidence' to
see if it supported the denial of the zoning change request. 1 It
rejected the plaintiffs! argument that major changes within the
area'28 made the property in question worthless under a res-
1965, the area was rezoned residential and the service station was granted nonconforming
use status. Id.
122 Id.
1
2
3 Id. The plaintiffs originally appealed from tle order, which was issued on the
basis that the physical conversion of the structure was improper, but the appeal was un-
successful on procedural grounds. Id.
124 593 S.W.2d at 876-77. The commission's resolution denying the zone change was
issued after a public hearing held in accordance with KRS §§ 100.211, .214 (1982) and
finding of facts required by KBS § 100.213 (1982). Id.
125 Id. at 877.
" The court of appeals found that a circuit court's scope of review in zoning matters
is limited to determining whether the agency acted within its powers; whether the agency
afforded procedural due process to the parties; and whether the agency made findings of
fact supported by substantial evidence in granting or denying the zoning change request.
Id. Also, it noted that a de novo trial by the circuit court is impermissible. Id. (citing City
of Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1971); American Beauty Homes Corp. v.
Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 379 S.W.2d 450 (Ky. 1964)).
Under the facts of this case, the court's review was limited to whether the evidence sup-
ported the denial as required by due process and KRS § 100.213 (1982).
127 See KRS § 100.213 (1982). The purpose of the statute, in requiring that certain
conditions be met before a map amendment is permitted, is to insure that zoning conforms
to prior planning and to prevent indiscriminate, piecemeal rezoning. Manley v. City of
Maysville, 528 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Ky. 1975); Hines v. Pinchback-Halloran Volkswagen,
Inc., 513 S.W.2d 492, 494 (Ky. 1974). Without such restrictions on the ability of a com-
munity to grant a zone change, the requirement in KBS § 100.183 (1982) that each plan-
ning unit prepare a comprehensive plan would be made meaningless by subsequent arbi-
trary zone changes.
128 593 S.W.2d at 877-78. The area was zoned commercial from 1943-65 but pri-
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* idential zoning classification because the plaintiffs had not ex-
plored the fact that the residential classification permitted uses
other than single-family residential.' It also found that the com-
mission and the fiscal court had acted in accordance with a prop-
erly developed comprehensive plan, and noted that neighbor-
hood residents strongly opposed any variation from the plan. 130
The court concluded the plaintiffs had failed to present com-
pelling evidence to support their claimed need for rezoning and
that, although obvious hardship befell the owners, hardship
alone was not a sufficient basis for a zoning change. Finding that
the planning commission and the fiscal court had not acted arbi-
trarily in denying the request, 13 the court of appeals reversed the
circuit court 32 and upheld elimination of the nonconforming use.
D. Disqualification of Planning Commission Members
The Zoning Enabling Act provides that "[a]ny member of a
planning commission who has any direct or indirect financial in-
terest in the outcome of any question before the body shall dis-
close the nature of the interest and shall disqualify himself from
manly residential, not commercial development, occurred.
'29 Id. at 876-77. The court agreed that the property in question would not be suit-
able for a residence because the land was paved and surrounding land uses included a dry
cleaner, a convenience grocery store and a service station. Id. at 876-77. However, the
court noted that the residential zone permitted churches, schools and clubs in addition to
single-family dwellings. Id.
130 Id. at 877.
131 The test of arbitrariness to be followed on review of decisions made by a planning
commission or a fiscal court is drawn from an earlier decision, Fiscal Court v. Stallings,
515.S.W.2d 234 (Ky. 1974). For a case where refusal to make a zoning reclassification was
.Jeld to be arbitrary, see Taylor v. Coblin, 461 S.W.2d 78 (Ky, 1970). Note that the local
legislative body must make sufficient independent findings of fact to override a planning
commission's denial of a zoning change request. Caller v. Ison, 508 S.W.2d 776, 777 (Ky.
1974); McKinstry v. Wells, 548 S.W.2d 169, 174 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977). The fiscal court,
however, may adopt the findings of the planning commission, as the fiscal court did in
Landgrave, 593 S.W.2d at 877, when it approved the planning commission's ruling. See
City of Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d at 173.
"2 593 S.W.2d at 878. The court did not reach the second issue raised on appeal,
i.e., whether the circuit court could direct a zone map amendment, if the denial was
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voting on the question."' In City-County Planning Commission
v. Jackson,1m a case of first impression, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals addressed the issue of what constitutes a "direct or indi-
rect financial interest in the outcome" and concluded that poten-
tial liability of commission members for an erroneous zoning rul-
ing does not constitute such a "financial interest."'"
The planning commission initially denied a developer's pro-
posal to construct multifamily housing on appropriately zoned
land.'3 The developer filed suit in United States District Court,
requesting that the commission's decision be reversed and that
$1.6 million in damages be awarded against the commission
members.a 7 Prior to determining whether monetary damages
should be awarded, the federal court ordered a new hearing at
which the commission approved the developer's plan.1s Resi-
dents of the neighborhood in which the proposed project was to
be constructed then appealed the commission's decision. 139
The residents argued that the potential liability of the com-
mission members for the damage claim of the developer was a
sufficient financial interest to disqualify the entire commission
from acting on the developer's application. 140 The Kentucky
Court of Appeals found that the disqualification statute was in-
tended "to prevent direct and indirect financial enrichment to
the board members . .. who [have] property or matters for con-
sideration by the commission" and was not intended "to deprive
members from ruling on a matter because they have been finan-
found to have been arbitrary. Id. For a case holding that a circuit court has no power to
direct a zone map amendment, see 548 S.W.2d at 174.
'3 KRS § 100.171(1) (1982).
134 610 S.W.2d 930 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
135 Id. at 932.
138 Id. at 930. Although the planned construction of multifamily housing was proper
for the zone, the planning commission was required by local ordinance to determine that'
plans and specifications were appropriate for a particular neighborhood. Id. After a hear-
ing, the commission denied approval on that ground. Id.
137 Id.
1
38 Id.
1'9 Id. at 931.
140 Id. The approval would have been void for lack of a quorum at the meeting ap-
proving the development. KBS § 100.171 (1982).
1981-821
KENTucK LAW JouRNAL [Vol. 70
cially threatened or are placed under some comparable
duress."141 Therefore, the commission members were held qual-
ified to act upon the developer's request for approval of his subdi-
vision plans because possible financial enrichment was not in-
volved.142
The court of appeals also noted that if the rule suggested by
the residents were adopted, filing of a damage suit by a disap-
pointed applicant would effectively immobilize a planning com-
mission.143 Although the rule adopted by the court precludes the
possibility that a damage claim will obstruct the administrative
process, it leaves the door open to a situation where the threat of
a damage action against a planning commission may encourage a
commission to acquiesce to the demands of the applicant.
141 610 S.W.2d at 932. Because this was a case of first impression, the court looked to
decisions in other jurisdictions for guidance. The court relied on three Connecticut cases:
Anderson v. Zoning Comm'n, 253 A.2d 16 (Conn. 1968) (refusing to disqualify zoning
commission member whose interest was extremely remote); Kovalik v. Planning & Zoning
Comm'n, 234 A.2d 838 (Conn. 1978) (disqualifying commission member who owned
eight percent of land in zone being considered); Lake Garda Improvement Ass'n v. Town
Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 199 A.2d 162 (Conn. 1964) (invalidating zoning changes be-
cause of commission member's personal litigation with opponent of the change).
The Jackson court turned to Connecticut law mainly because it found the Con-
necticut disqualification provision similar to Kentucky's. 610 S.W.2d at 931. Compare
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-11 (West Supp. 1981) with KRS § 100.171(1) (1982). Two
distinctions are readily apparent, however: (1) the Connecticut provision does not require
the commission member to disclose the nature of the interest while under Kentucky law he
must; and (2) the Kentucky statute refers only to financial interests while the Connecticut
statute refers to both financial and personal interests. By analogizing to Connecticut law,
the Kentucky court may be erroneously reading the personal interest limitation into Ken-
tucky law.
142 610 S.W.2d at 932. The courts do not agree on whether disqualification is neces-
sary. See 3 E. YOKELY, supra note 113, at § 18-8. Some courts stress that a zoning commis-
sion member should be disqualified if his activities project an appearance of bias. Daly v.
Town Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 191 A.2d 250 (Conn. 1963); Barbara Realty Co. v.
Zoning Bd. of Review, 128 A.2d 342 (R.I. 1957). Other decisions take a more lenient ap-
proach. Anthony v. City of Kewanee, 223 N.E.2d 738 (Ill. App. 1967) (self-interest of
council member regarding zone change did not require withdrawal in the absence of
fraud); Turf Valley Assocs. v. Zoning Bd., 278 A.2d 574 (Md. 1971) (open expression of
stance on amendment was not adequate bias for requiring disqualification).
143 610 S.W.2d at 931. Other courts have also expressed concern about the handicap
which would be placed on local government if every conceivable interest could force zon-
ing officials to disqualify themselves. Armstrong v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 257 A.2d 799,
806 (Conn. 1969); Anderson v. Zoning Comm'n, 253 A.2d at 20.
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E. Intent of the Zoning Enabling Act
In Kindred Homes, Inc. v. Dean, 44 the Kentucky Court of
Appeals addressed the continued validity of a county's interim
zoning regulations' 45 after adopting a comprehensive plan.'" The
interim regulations zoned agricultural all land in the county ex-
cept for two cities. The fiscal court, adopting the planning com-
mission's recommendation, denied the plaintiffs a zoning map
amendment which would permit them to build a residential de-
velopment on land zoned agricultural under the interim regula-
tions. 147
Although the court of appeals recognized that interim zoning
regulations adopted pursuant to the statement of goals and objec-
tives for a comprehensive plan are valid,'" the court invalidated
these interim regulations because the planning commission had
failed to replace them with permanent controls after the compre-
hensive plan was adopted.149 Therefore, the plaintiffs were held
'44 605 S.W.2d 15 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
145 Interim zoning regulations are provided for in KRS § 100.334(2) (1982).
The purpose behind authorizing communities to adopt interim zoning regula-
tions prior to adoption of a comprehensive plan is to temporarily preserve the status quo. 2
E. YOKELY, supra note 113, at § 10-3. If the community lacks such authority, the danger is
that developers and others, upon learning of the intent to adopt a comprehensive plan,
will move quickly to establish otherwise incompatible uses in the interim period prior to
the completion of the plan. Those incompatible uses will then have to be allowed to re-
main as nonconforming.
Courts in other states have split on the question of whether interim zoning regula-
tions are a valid exercise of the police power. Id. at § 10-2. Kentucky follows the majority
rule of upholding interim zoning regulations when the community has statutory authority
to enact the controls. Id. at § 10-6. Darlington v. Board of Councilmen, 140 S.W.2d 392,
395 (Ky. 1940); Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. No. 77-540 (Sept. 1, 1977). Grounds other than the
absence of a statutory grant of authority on which temporary controls have been held in-
valid include: (1) enactment of the ordinance to prevent development by particular indi-
viduals; (2) indefinite language; (3) unusually long delays in implementing a final plan;
(4) failure to follow the requirements outlined in the state zoning enabling act for adoption
of such regulations. 2 E. YOKELY, supra note 113, at § 10-5.
1' 605 S.W.2d at 16.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 17. The court cited Daviess County v. Snyder, 556 S.W.2d 688 (Ky. 1977),
in which the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the statement of goals and objectives re-
quired by KitS § 100.193 (1982) must be adopted prior to enactment of interim zoning or-
dinances in order for the ordinances to be held valid.
149 605 S.W.2d at 17. The court drew on the earlier decision of City of Erlanger v.
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not bound by the commission's decision which had been based on
the interim regulations. Voiding the interim regulations left in
effect only the comprehensive plan.150
The Kindred Homes decision is consistent with the purpose
of the Zoning Enabling Act to require zoning both to conform to
prior planning and not to be changed in piecemeal fashion. 51 A
reasoned, planned approach to growth cannot be achieved if a
community continues to rely on interim regulations enacted prior
to development of a comprehensive plan. To hold otherwise ren-
ders worthless the planning process and comprehensive plan.
In Creative Displays, Inc. v. City of Florence, 152 the integrity
of the Zoning Enabling Act in insuring a methodical approach to
growth was again at stake, but this time in the context of the
adoption of a comprehensive plan. 10 The suit challenged the va-
lidity of billboard ordinances based on a joint city-county com-
prehensive plan adopted in 1966 in an effort to comply with the
Hoff, 535 S.W.2d 86 (Ky. 1976). The Hoff suit arose when owners of property in a shop-
ping center were denied a building permit for a service station based on a zoning regula-
tion which prohibited service stations in that area. Id. at 87. The city adopted a compre-
hensive plan pursuant to the Zoning Enabling Act, but failed to adopt permanent zoning
ordinances based on the comprehensive plan. Id. Instead, it merely reenacted as "perma-
nent zoning regulations" its preexisting interim regulations to meet the time limits con-
tained in KRS § 100.367 (1982). The Hoff court held that the ordinances were inconsistent
with the comprehensive plan and were therefore invalid. 535 S.W.2d at 88.
The Kindred Homes, Inc. court analogized from Hoff that interim zoning regula-
tions adopted pursuant to a statement of goals and objectives become invalid when the
regulations were incompatible with a comprehensive plan adopted at a later date. 605
S.W.2d at 17. Certainly interim zoning regulations which zone the greater part of a
county agricultural in the face of a comprehensive plan which recognizes the potential for
residential development in the area are inherently incompatible.
50 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's holding as void the planning
commission's amendments to the comprehensive plan without the fiscal court's approval.
605 S.W.2d at 18.
151 Hines v. Pinchback-Hallbran Volkswagen, Inc., 513 S.W.2d 492; City of
Louisville v. Kavanaugh, 495 S.W.2d 502 (Ky. 1973); KRS § 100.191 (1982).
152 602 S.W.2d 682 (Ky. 1980).
153 The term "comprehensive plan" has been defined as "a general plan to control
and direct the use and development of property in a municipality ... by dividing it into
districts according to the present and potential use of the property." 1 E. YOKELY, supra
note 113, at § 5-3. Requiring zoning ordinances to be in accordance with the comprehen-
sive plan is intended to prevent an arbitrary or capricious exercise of the zoning power. Id.
at § 5-2. See the text accompanying notes 101-07 supra for an outline of the required com-
ponents and process for formulating a comprehensive plan in Kentucky.
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Act.'s The plan simply mirrored preexisting, separate plans for
the city and county.ss The Kentucky Supreme Court inval-
idated ' 56 the billboard ordinance because the comprehensive plan
failed to comply with the requirements of the Zoning Enabling
Act.,n'
The Court found that the pro forma adoption of the preexist-
ing plans failed to comply with the requirement that each plan-
ning unit "shall prepare" a comprehensive plan.I' Furthermore,
the statement of goals and objectives in the individual preexisting
city and county plans did not properly address the concerns of a
county-wide planning unit.15o Similarly, the research, analysis,
and projections prepared separately for the existing city and
county plans were found insufficient to support county-wide
planning decisions.lw° Finally, the Court found that the public
154 602 S.W.2d at 683.
155 Id. The plaintiffs agreed that the substantive requirements of KRS § 100.187
(1982), which establishes ininimum contents of a comprehensive plan, had been met.
However, the plaintiffs still argued that the comprehensive plan was invalid because of
the proforma manner in which it was adopted. 602 S.W.2d at 683.
1 The court of appeals had upheld the billboard ordinances, finding that the plan-
ning unit's comprehensive plan was valid because it was in "substantial compliance with
the applicable statutory requirements." Creative Displays, Inc. v. City of Florence, No.
78-CA-1195-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1979). The Kentucky Supreme Court expressly
stated that the "substantial compliance" standard used by the court of appeals was im-
proper and that the Act must be strictly construed. 602 S.W.2d at 684 (citing Daviess
County v. Snyder, 556 S.W.2d at 688; City of Erlanger v. Hoff, 535 S.W.2d at 86; Hines
v. Pinchback-Halloran Volkswagen, Inc., 513 S.W.2d at 492).
157 Underlying the Court's holding was concern that the city and county had evaded
the legislature's intent to encourage county-wide zoning in more than name only. 602
S.W.2d at 683. See KRS § 100.121 (1982). The Act strongly encourages the formation of
joint planning units. Furthermore, the Act allows a city or county to establish an indepen-
dent planning unit after the failure of certain procedures which include "interrogation"
between city and county leaders toward establishing a joint planning unit. KES S 100.117
(1982).
1;8 602 S.W.2d at 683. KS § 100.183 (1982) mandates that the commissioner "shall
prepare a comprehensive plan." Id. The Court observed in Creative Displays that the
Zoning Enabling Act "is predicated on the belief that good zoning only follows from good.
planning." 602 S.W.2d at 683.
159 602 S.W.2d at 683. KRS §§ 100.187(1)-.193 (1982) require that the planning
commission for the unit prepare a statement of goals and objectives as an element of the
comprehensive plan. The Court acknowledged that the plan prepared by the commission
in Creative Displays did contain a statement of goals and objectives. 602 S.W.2d at 683.
However, because the statement was developed without considering the needs of the plan-
ning unit as a whole, its content was of little value. Id.
110 602 S.W.2d at 683. KRS § 100.191 (1982) requires that extensive research and
"analysis be done to provide a solid basis for the development of a comprehensive plan.
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hearings held on the individual city and county plans did not sat-
isfy the requirement that a public hearing be held before adop-
tion of a comprehensive plan.,'' As the comprehensive plan was
invalidated, the ordinances based on it were likewise held in-
valid.162
F. Bond Forfeiture Under Conditional Use Permits
Louisville & Jefferson County Board of Zoning Adjustment
v. Joseph C. Hofgesang Sand Co. 16 raised a question about bond
forfeiture similar to that involved in performance bond forfeit-
ures in surface mining.164 In order to obtain a conditional use per-
mit'6 5 for the operation of a sanitary landfill, the company
executed a bond to insure compliance with the landfill regula-
tions. 16 Subsequently, the permit was revoked because of the
company's noncompliance' 67 and forfeiture of the entire amount
161 602 S.W.2d at 683-84. KRS § 100.197 (1982) provides that "[t]he planning com-
mission shall hold a public hearing and adopt the element [of the comprehensive plan] by
a regulation .... " The Court found that the failure to hold a public hearing on the
county-wide comprehensive plan deprived the citizens of the county and the city of the op-
portunity to express their views. 602 S.W.2d at 683-84.
'
6 2 Id. at 684. Pursuant to KRS § 100.367 (1982), since the deadline for compliance
had passed, the comprehensive plan and ordinances were void. See City of Erlanger v.
Hoff, 535 S.W.2d at 88.
163 617 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1981).
" Performance bonds in surface mining are used to secure compliance with the
rules and regulations governing surface mining. If an operator's permit is revoked for non-
compliance with these rules and regulations, the bond is forfeited. KBS § 350.130(1)
(Cum. Supp. 1980).
165 See KRS § 100.111(5) (1982) which defines a conditional use. See also KRS §§
100.217, .237 (1982) for creation and duties of a board of adjustment which is empowered
to grant conditional use permits.
The conditional use permit is a valid zoning technique which grants to a commu-
nity the flexibility to place in a zone a use which would otherwise be excluded, with condi-
tions to limit the disadvantages of allowing the use. See generally 2 E. YOKELY, supra note
113, at § 14-9. Although the two concepts are sometimes confused, a conditional use is not
the equivalent of a usi variance. Id. The distinction between the two is not likely to pre-
sent a problem in Kentucky, however, because the Kentucky Zoning Enabling Act allows
variances only in dimensions, not use. KRS § 100.241 (1982).
16 617 S.W.2d at 40.
'67 Id. The company was placing toxic liquid waste in the landfill, a use prohibited
by local land use regulations. Id. The permit was revoked pursuant to KBS § 100.237(4)
(1982) which provides for periodic inspections of the permitted site to determine whether
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of the bond was sought."' The Kentucky Supreme Court artic-
ulated the following general rule:
[Wihere a bond is given to a public body as a condition of a li-
cense or as a condition of compliance with the law, upon a
breach, the full penalty of such bond may be recovered, in the
absence of express or implied provisions to the contrary in the
statute or ordinance that prescribes the bond, or in the bond it-
self.'6
The Court concluded that nothing in the language of the
bond, 170 the mortgage securing the bond, 7' or the zoning ordi-
nance mandating execution of the bond,172 evidenced any inten-
the landowner is complying with the conditions placed on the use, a hearing procedure to
be followed in the event noncompliance is discovered, and an authorization of revocation
of the permit upon a finding of noncompliance.
g 617 S.W.2d at 40. The board held a mortgage on the property in question as se-
curity for the bond. Id. The case arose as a condemnation action by the county instituted
after the conditional use permit was revoked. The board was named a party because of its
mortgagor status. Id. at 41. The board then cross-claimed for the full amount of the bond.
The company argued that the board was only entitled to recover the amount necessary to
cover any damage which the board had incurred as a result of the noncompliance. Id. at
40.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the board of adjustment but was
reversed by the court of appeals which relied on American Book Co. v. Wells, 83 S.W. 622
(Ky. 1904), and Commonwealth v. Ginn, 63 S.W. 467 (Ky. 1901), to hold that the
amount of bond to be forfeited depended on whether the parties intended it to serve as a
penalty or as liquidated damages. 617 S.W.2d at 41. The Kentucky Supreme Court recog-
nized that the Ginn decision discussed liquidated damages in holding that the full amount
of the bond should be forfeited. Id. However, the Court disagreed with the court of ap-
peals! interpretation of Ginn and Wells, pointing to the later case of City of Paducah v.
Jones, 104 S.W. 971 (Ky. 1907), which held that the parties' intentions and any questions
of the amount of damages are irrelevant when a bond is executed as security by a licensee
that the law will be obeyed. 617 S.W.2d at 42.
169 Id. at 41 (citing United States v. Zerby, 271 U.S. 332 (1926); 104 S.W. 971; 83
S.W. 622; 63 S.W. 467).
170 The bond stated that "the condition of this obligation is such that if the Principal
shall perform said... operation in accordance with the conditions of said application
and approval then this obligation shall be null and void; otherwise to remain in full force
and effect." 617 S.W.2d at 41.
171 The statement of purpose in the mortgage instrument provided "[t]hat the mort-
gagor has this day executed a penal bond to the morgagee ... to secure its faithful perfor-
mance of all regulations and conditions set forth in the application and approval thereof
for conditional use to permit ... a landfill area for an industrial and sanitary
dump .... Id.
172 Id.
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tion contrary to a total bond forfeiture.7 3 It stated that the pur-
pose of the bonding requirement is not to provide compensation
for damages resulting from noncompliance, but rather to act as a
penalty to insure compliance with the regulations. 174
173 Id.
17 4 Id. at 42. The Court emphasized that the right to operate a landfill is a privilege
conferred upon the company by the board. The board, as grantor, has the right to condi-
tion the exercise of that privilege including the ability to require a bond as insurance that
the conditions will be satisfied. Id.
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